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Antitrust and Regulation 
 
Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker* 
 
Within a brief span, Congress adopted the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and the 
Sherman Act (1890). In imposing federal regulation on railroads, the Interstate Com-
merce Act inaugurated the era of substantial federal regulation of individual industries, 
while the Sherman Act created a baseline for the control of competition in the United 
States by generally barring contracts in restraint of trade and forbidding monopolization. 
The rise of the railroads and the great trusts raised concerns about economic power and 
spurred politicians to formulate a national policy toward competition. Since 1890, policy 
makers have been forced repeatedly to work through how to interleave a fully general 
approach to competition under the antitrust laws with industry-specific approaches to 
competition under regulatory statutes. 
That has been a process of learning, but even without learning, shifting political 
winds would naturally lead to fits and starts as antitrust and specific regulatory statutes 
have jostled and combined and sometimes even competed in establishing a framework for 
controlling competition. After more than a century of effort, it is possible to advance a 
few general conclusions. Antitrust can say no but struggles with saying yes. Less crypti-
cally, antitrust is a poor framework for price setting or for establishing affirmative duties 
toward rivals. Price setting in a non-market context often requires detailed industry 
knowledge and often turns on political decisions about levels of service and the rate of 
return to capital needed to provide those services. The virtue and vice of federal judges is 
they are generalists, not industry specialists, and, once appointed, they are insulated from 
the political process. If there is a natural monopoly and prices need to be set or we are 
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going to create a duty to, say, share an incumbent’s phone network with an entrant, the 
evidence suggests that it is generally best to do that through (enlightened) regulation, not 
antitrust, though obviously poor regulation can impose enormous costs. 
But antitrust says no very well, while regulators often have a hard time saying no. 
Area-specific regulation through special agencies gives rise to the fear that the regulators 
will be captured by the regulated industry (or other interest groups). Regulators will have 
come from industry or will dream of exiting to private sector salaries. Regulators won’t 
say no often enough to proposals that benefit special interests. But federal judges are 
genuinely independent (or, at least, more so than regulators) and the docket of the federal 
judiciary is completely general. A general antitrust statute, implemented by independent 
federal judges—limited to issues within their competence—can protect the competitive 
process, especially with the rise of economic reasoning in antitrust. 
Our main conclusion is that in the century-long seesaw battle over how to design 
competition policy, the Sherman Act has turned out to be more enduring than regulation. 
As the difficulties of regulation have emerged and as economic reasoning has improved 
the effectiveness of the Sherman Act, enforcement of the Sherman Act through an inde-
pendent judiciary has shown itself to deliver lower prices and less promotion of special 
interests than regulation, causing a shift away from regulation. This does not, of course, 
mean that all regulation should vanish, especially for industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics, but rather that, when necessary, regulation should try to allow as much 
competition as possible, constrained only by the Sherman Act. Where activities in an in-
dustry remain partially regulated, antitrust and regulation can be used together in a com-
plementary way to control competition and, in some cases, it is possible to use antitrust 
as a constraint on regulators. 
This Chapter is divided into three sections. First, we consider the general question of 
how competition policy should be implemented. We do that by considering possible roles 
for courts and regulatory agencies as set out in the modern political science literature on 
legislative bargaining. We analyze the relative advantages and disadvantages of regula-
tion versus antitrust as a means of formulating antitrust policy. We then consider one par-
ticular question: exclusion from antitrust, or put differently, antitrust immunities. Second, 
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we return to the beginning of the formulation of competition policy by considering the 
period starting with the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act. This history illus-
trates the initial view of regulation and antitrust as two competing alternatives to control 
competition, but with some recognition that the two would interact in unforeseen ways. 
We pursue the central question that dominated early competition policy and remains a 
central policy question, namely, how should prices be set? Third, we turn our attention to 
a group of industries that have been a focus of regulation for over a hundred years—
network industries—and analyze their recent deregulation. We address the fundamental 
question that has occupied and continues to occupy regulatory and antitrust decisions in 
those industries: how should those markets be structured and specifically what sort of 
interconnection rights should be established? We use this recent history to illustrate the 
movement away from regulation toward antitrust, with the two being used as comple-
ments to control competition in some industries.  
I. Assigning Responsibility for Controlling Competition 
We start by framing the general problem faced by Congress and the President in choosing 
whether and to what extent to delegate implementation of a policy to a third party. The 
delegation will take the form of legislation and the scope of the delegation may be deter-
mined in part by the specificity of the language used in the statute. We want to address 
that problem generally and then turn to what that means for the interaction of antitrust 
and regulation. 
A. The General Setting 
Under the U.S. Constitution, laws are enacted when the Senate, the House and the Presi-
dent each vote in favor of a proposed bill. That statement simplifies in that it ignores the 
possibility that Congress has sufficient votes (two-thirds in each chamber) to override a 
veto by the President, and it also skips over the interesting and tricky issue of the extent 
to which domestic legislation can be set through the treaty-making power, where the 
President is empowered to make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senate vote in 
favor. 
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Following McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1989), we treat the process of creating leg-
islation as a principal/agent problem or, more precisely and more interestingly, as a three 
principal/multiple agents problem. It is conventional (see, e.g., Shepsle & Bonchek, 
1997, pp. 358-68) in the rational choice literature in political science to model legislation 
as a principal delegating power to an agent, where either a court or an agency acts as the 
agent in implementing the legislation. In the principal/agent problem faced in creating 
legislation, Congress and the President typically delegate to one of two agents: Article III 
courts or specialized agencies subject to court oversight. By institutional design, Con-
gress and the President have relatively weak controls against the judiciary—we call this 
separation of powers—but, together and separately, the House, Senate and President can 
choose to retain stronger control over agencies. 
Focus on a standard principal/agent problem, namely that the agent will depart from 
the principal’s goals and pursue his own. In the political science literature, this is labeled 
the problem of bureaucratic drift. For legislation to get passed, the House, Senate and 
President negotiate over potential policies. But delegation is inevitable: judges decide 
actual cases, not Congress or the President, and with the rise of the administrative state, 
implementation of legislation can be delegated directly to courts or first to agencies with 
appeals to courts (and judicial review of agency action need not be a given). 
The negotiation process that results in unanimous agreement by the House, Senate 
and President on new legislation has to take into account what will happen in the subse-
quent delegation to courts or agencies. Each player in the negotiation game should do 
backwards induction looking forward to see how the agent will actually implement the 
enacted legislation, and in light of that, design the legislation. (The players could just 
care about enactment and not about implementation if that is how their constituencies 
keep score, but we will assume that all participants are interested in actual results, and 
not just appearances.) To match the political science literature, treat the House (H), Sen-
ate (S), President (P) and agent as each having preferences over the particular policy in 
question and focus on the essential dynamic that takes place among our four players. Af-
ter negotiation, unanimity is reached and a bill is passed (absent unanimity nothing hap-
pens). The agent now implements the legislation. 
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What constrains how the agent does so? Consider possible sources of restrictions: the 
original legislation; oversight and monitoring; internal agency norms; and the threat of 
subsequent legislation. Focus initially on the possibility of constraint through subsequent 
legislation that overturns the decision of the agent. Note that this legislation requires a 
unanimous vote among H, S and P, as any one of them has the power to block a change 
from the new status quo defined by the agent’s decision. As an initial cut, the agent then 
has a free hand to implement her policy preferences rather than implement with fidelity 
the deal struck among H, S and P. So if the agent’s policy preferences matched more 
closely, say, P, the agent could implement a policy that P would find superior to the deal 
captured in the negotiated legislation, and P would veto any subsequent legislative effort 
to overturn the agent’s decision. 
That doesn’t mean that the new status quo would remain, but any new law negotiated 
among H, S and P would need to make P better off than he is under the agent’s decision. 
And in the face of that law, the agent could once again refuse to implement the deal ne-
gotiated and instead implement her policy preferences. Of course, none of this should be 
lost on H, S and P when they negotiate the original law. Again, they will care about how 
the legislation is actually implemented, not the deal cut. H, S and P can anticipate bu-
reaucratic drift. If H and S know that the agent will deviate from the original statute in 
the direction of P with the agent’s action protected by P’s veto, H and S will never make 
the deal in the first place. A little bit of backwards induction goes a long way. 
We quickly see the complexities of having a process involving delegation. The agent 
can try to implement his own agenda, deviating from the original intent, but not enough 
to induce intervention by the principals. Moreover, if H has been delegated control over 
the agent, H can cheat on the agreement with HSP and deviate from the original agree-
ment. If a Congressman wants to try to cheat on the original legislative deal, he can do so 
if he can exert power over his agent. As Landes and Posner (1979) argued in their expla-
nation of the role of an independent judiciary, the congressman can commit to not cheat-
ing by relinquishing his power over the agent. At the same time, giving up control over 
the agent means that the agent now has freedom to implement her own policy prefer-
ences. Hands-tying at the front-end equals loss of control at the back end. If the agent 
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doesn’t face meaningful discipline, why should the agent pay much (any?) attention to 
the statute at all? 
But at the same time, independence means that the agent can implement her prefer-
ences in the veto zone, that is, the spots in the policy space where Congress and the Presi-
dent will not agree unanimously to overturn the agent’s decision. And the fact will be an-
ticipated by the institutional players who will be disadvantaged by the deviation. They 
will not want independence in their agent and will instead want to design controls over 
the agent that make fidelity to the original deal possible. 
That would be true if H, S and P were just seeking to implement their own independ-
ent policy preferences, but would also be true if we think of the lawmakers as just selling 
off legislation to the highest bidder (or as having preferences that value both legislative 
outcomes and transfers from legislation buyers). H, S and P will also want controls on 
themselves, at least as a group, so that they can ensure that their control over the agent 
doesn’t allow them to cheat on the original deal that was cut amongst themselves or with 
the legislation purchaser. After the fact, they would like to cheat, either individually or as 
a group, but that too will be anticipated by the legislation purchaser, so H, S and P need a 
commitment mechanism to maximize the amount that they can charge legislation pur-
chasers. 
We can sketch out what such a system might look like. Consider a basic public choice 
model with an interested party simply purchasing legislation that will be implemented by 
an agent. We can offer H, S and P each some levers of oversight over the agent. That may 
be enough to solve the problem of the agent cheating. H needs to have sufficient individ-
ual power to block moves by the agent away from the original law, and so too for S and 
P. Or we need to make sure that the legislation purchaser can exercise oversight powers 
against H, S and P to make sure that they faithfully implement the original deal bought 
and paid for by the legislation purchaser. 
What should our legislation purchaser fear most, cheating by the principal or cheating 
by the agent? Purchasers have little control over Article III judges and much more control 
over congressional principals and agency agents. Both of these should push the legisla-
tion purchaser towards favoring a captive agency. Legislation purchasers are well-
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situated to punish a member of Congress who cheats on the original deal by imposing her 
will on the agency. Members of Congress run every two years (House) or six years (Sen-
ate) and are constantly raising money for reelection (the best way to discourage compet-
ing candidates is to amass a large pile of money). A member who cheats on a deal with a 
legislation purchaser reveals himself to be a poor candidate for future deals and future 
campaign contributions. The need to return to the market for campaign funds disciplines 
members of Congress from using their influence on agents to cheat on the original deal 
that was cut. In contrast, legislation buyers can exercise little indirect or direct control 
over judges, since Congress and the President both lack control over Article III judges. 
We should make one other point about this structure. Agency decisions are typically 
subject to appeals to independent federal judges. That would seem to make the judges the 
ultimate authority but that depends importantly on what judges do with agency actions. 
Under the Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine (Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), judges give agencies wide-latitude in interpreting 
federal statutes. Not unlimited latitude, but Chevron is a policy of substantial deference 
to agencies. Chevron deference creates an agent largely outside of judicial control, and 
therefore subject to meaningful congressional control. That in turn means that Congress 
and the President can more credibly commit to those seeking legislation by delegating to 
independent agencies than it can to Article III courts. Chevron preserves broad independ-
ence for agencies as against the courts—thereby making them into actors that elected of-
ficials can control—while appeals to courts operate as a hedge against agents who have 
deviated too far from what their principals wanted. 
B. Agent Choice in Antitrust and Regulated Industries 
On July 2, 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act and in so doing created a baseline for 
the control of competition in the United States. To the modern eye, the Sherman Act is 
notable for its simultaneous brevity and comprehensiveness. The entire statute is set forth 
in eight sections and barely covers more than one page in the Statutes at Large. Section 1 
condemned every contract in restraint of trade and Section 2 made a criminal of every 
person who monopolized. Consider two questions: (1) Why was the Sherman Act imple-
mented in the federal courts, and not through a federal agency?; and (2) Given the 
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breadth of the Sherman Act, what else would we need to regulate competition? Why 
doesn’t the Sherman Act suffice, or, given our description of the legislative process 
above, when and how should we expect to add new laws regulating competition? 
1. WHO INITIALLY GETS THE SHERMAN ACT? 
On the first question, a little history may help. At the time that the Sherman Act was 
passed, the Interstate Commerce Commission was still a baby, a bold experiment in a 
highly-specialized but central industry. It would have been a sizeable leap of faith to ap-
ply the same mechanism to the entire economy. The natural, conservative move was to 
use the federal courts. Moreover, to fast forward twenty-five years to 1914, we did make 
that jump when we created the Federal Trade Commission (more on that at the end of 
Section III). 
The agency choice literature (Fiorina (1982), Stephenson (2005)) compares the rela-
tive stability of decision-making in agencies and courts. Commissions typically are small 
and are controlled by the party of the President; the President also chooses the chair of 
the commission (this was roughly how the ICC worked and is how the FCC and FTC 
work today). Turnover of the presidency means turnover of the Commission. Commis-
sions therefore may exhibit high-variance across periods of time—a Democratic FTC 
looks different from a Republican FTC—but greater coherence among related decisions 
made within a particular window. In contrast, the federal courts are quite stable over 
time, but are subject to very little control at any point in time. But the sheer number of 
judges means that two contemporaneous decisions may reach quite different outcomes. 
This helps to explain why in 1887 an agency was a relatively more attractive choice 
for railroads than it was for the general economy. The railroads were the first great net-
work industry (we could fight about canals). The nature of a network is that regulatory 
decisions in one part of the network can have large effects in other parts of the network. 
If one regulator sets a track gauge of 5 feet, while another sets it at 4 feet, 6 inches, the 
network will operate inefficiently. This was precisely the issue in the fierce fight over 
constitutional protection in rate-setting for railroads. State regulators were setting low 
rates for intrastate shipments, hoping to keep the railroads solvent on the back of inter-
state rates. The Supreme Court understood that fully when it decided Smyth v. Ames in 
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1898 (169 U.S. 466 (1898)) and imposed limits on state rate-making for railroads that 
could be deemed confiscatory. 
But outside of railroads, in the rest of the economy around the beginning of the 20th 
century, regional inconsistencies in industry practices were less important. If the Second 
Circuit reached one antitrust outcome, and the Seventh Circuit another, the greater the 
extent to which economic activity was local or regional, the less that these regulatory dif-
ferences mattered. Local (uncoordinated) antitrust enforcement, whether federally at the 
circuit level or by states, was less costly to the economy when the economy was a local 
economy—the 1900s and the early 20th Century—than it is today. 
When many parts in the economic system need to move at the same time—when we 
are speaking of co-evolution, as it were, rather than just evolution—it may be very hard 
for lower federal courts to coordinate decision-making, and Supreme Court decisions are 
rare and slow to come. The inefficiency in a network industry of having uncoordinated 
decision-making could be very high. Plus courts are passive when it comes to agenda-
setting: they can only decide the cases that come before them. In contrast, agencies ex-
pressly control their own agendas, subject to the original statute to be sure, but tied down 
often by nothing more than a public interest standard. The ability to set agendas means 
that agencies can push forward on all parts of the economic system at the same time. 
Agencies can do punctuated equilibria: leaps from one spot to another, while courts are 
normally limited to smaller moves within established frameworks. Our logic predicts that 
as policy concerns with competition arise in particular industries, all else being equal, 
network industries are more likely than non-network industries to see their competition 
regulated by agencies, rather than the courts. 
2. WHEN IS THE SHERMAN ACT NOT THE BEST TOOL FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN PARTICULAR 
INDUSTRIES? 
Once the ICC and Sherman Act were established, how should we expect the evolution of 
competition policy in particular industries to proceed? Every attempt to control competi-
tion after 1890—whether within antitrust proper or outside of antitrust in the form of 
area-specific regulation—has to be understood in the context of the Sherman Act. Given 
its breadth, we might ask why weren’t the antitrust laws sufficient to regulate all indus-
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tries? The prevailing—but, to be sure, not universally-held—view of antitrust law in the 
U.S. is that it is designed to promote efficiency by protecting the competitive process to 
benefit society. Why shouldn’t that be enough? 
As noted in the introduction, antitrust and regulation have different comparative ad-
vantages. To grossly simplify, while both antitrust and regulation are a mix of economics 
and politics, antitrust is now organized around an economic core, while regulation is fre-
quently shaped by the political process. To draw that out, while the decision by the Anti-
trust Division in the Department of Justice or by the Federal Trade Commission to bring 
a case may be influenced by politics, once a case is brought, the ultimate decision regard-
ing the case is made by a federal judge. 
Federal courts are a poor forum for reflecting democratic values. Federal judges are 
supposed to enforce the law, not make political judgments. Judges implementing the 
Sherman Act are poorly situated to make assessments about the “right” price or quality 
for anything, be it a cup of coffee or a kilowatt of electricity. Pricing in electricity, for 
example, will depend on our willingness to endure blackouts, and if we think that at least 
parts of the electricity system are a natural monopoly—the transmission grid itself—the 
government will almost certainly be involved in price setting. Judges have little if any 
ability to determine the public’s tolerance for blackouts and we should want that to be 
determined as part of a political process. That means industry-specific regulation and ac-
countable regulators, and not general rules for competition implemented by judges sepa-
rated from democratic forces. 
But we should entrust to the political process only that which needs to be there. If we 
don’t have judges as independent decision-makers, we have regulators beholden either to 
the industries that they regulate or to other special interests. Competition is diverted from 
the marketplace to the regulator’s office, and the tools for success—ranging from subtle 
influence to out-and-out bribery—may be very different. Instead, we should regulate only 
when we must—natural monopoly being the core case—and leave general antitrust doc-
trine and the court system to handle the rest. The case of natural monopoly initially was 
often dealt with by explicit price regulation, though the optimal form of regulation has 
Carlton & Picker Antitrust and Regulation 11 
evolved over time (e.g., price caps) in recognition of the need to create incentives for 
regulated firms to act efficiently. 
C. Antitrust Immunities 
An unregulated industry subject only to the antitrust laws might seek an exemption from 
those laws for one of two reasons. The industry might want to avoid inefficiencies that 
the antitrust laws create. Alternatively, the industry might want to avoid the constraints of 
the antitrust laws and want to engage in anticompetitive behavior such as cartelization. 
Policing that line—separating good antitrust immunities from the bad—can be tricky. 
In some circumstances, collective action might be required to achieve efficiency, but 
Section 1 flatly forbids any contract in restraint of trade. Many R&D and information 
gathering activities, as well as sports leagues organized as joint ventures, create a high 
risk of antitrust liability, as the history of antitrust cases demonstrates.1 Farmer coopera-
tives are another example in which small firms may be able to achieve some economies 
by collective action but still remain independent firms that compete against each other. 
Often, these collaborative activities created no market power and only efficiencies but 
these could have faced Sherman Act actions, especially in the early days of antitrust. In-
deed Bittlingmayer (1985) has argued that the Sherman Act created antitrust liability for 
cooperative activities among horizontal competitors and thereby encouraged the massive 
merger wave around 1900. 
We may be able to solve this problem within antitrust proper through careful devel-
opment of doctrine, but beneficial activity that is close to the antitrust line risks treble 
damages. Plus firms face individual liability if they end up on the wrong side of the line, 
while an improvement in antitrust doctrine benefits the industry as a whole. This mis-
match between private costs and industry benefits means that for a particular industry, 
exemption from antitrust might be easier to implement than internal reform of antitrust 
doctrine through the courts. 
Antitrust immunities also serve a channeling function for activities to influence com-
petition policy. Absent the immunity, activity that influences competition policy takes 
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and Landes (2004). 
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place in the courts, before the Federal Trade Commission, and in Congress through the 
pursuit of new legislation. Immunity channels this competition, mainly to Congress. We 
can think of antitrust immunity as a commitment about how the policy game will be 
played, a commitment about where the next move will be made. It means that courts and 
agencies don’t get to move, and that instead the next move will be made by the legisla-
ture, though, of course, that could be a future legislature, rather than the current legisla-
ture. 
But there, of course, is a more pernicious reason that we should expect exemptions to 
our competition law: interest groups pursue benefits from legislatures and many of those 
benefits take the form of legislation. Firms may want to cartelize an industry to reap prof-
its. The Sherman Act would block that, hence an exemption from antitrust might be re-
quired. But exemption may not be enough for the serious cartelizer: a cartel cannot suc-
ceed in raising price unless entry can be restricted. With free entry it does little good to 
obtain an antitrust exemption. 
We therefore expect that where an interest group is powerful but cannot control entry 
it will combine an antitrust exemption with legislation that restricts entry (or just have the 
entry restriction built into the legislation through a tariff or licensing restriction). Failing 
that, the industry may prefer regulation to competition, with the regulator controlling en-
try and perhaps price. But as we know from the theory of political regulation, there are 
many interest groups that will have a voice in the regulatory process. Different groups of 
consumers and firms will have their own interests and compromises amongst them will 
be up to the regulator. It is unusual for a regulator to favor one group to the exclusion of 
all others, as Peltzman (1976) especially has shown (see also Stigler (1971), Posner 
(1974), and Becker (1983)). Therefore, a very powerful interest group would obtain ex-
emption with legislative entry restrictions, rather than regulation. 
There are many important parts of the economy which have received exemptions 
from the antitrust laws. The major areas are: 
• Agriculture and Fishing. The exemption allows cooperatives to form and even 
have joint marketing. Section 6 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 17) protected cer-
tain labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations and the 1922 Capper-
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Volstead Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292) addressed joint marketing associations. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act is odd in that it does not allow two firms, each with no 
market power, to set price, even though together they have no ability to raise 
price. The per se treatment of such price fixing is presumably justified by the be-
lief that such price setting can have no procompetitive purpose. One consequence 
of such a rule, especially when the interpretation of antitrust was unclear, was to 
promote mergers (Bittlingmayer (1985)). Another is for the industry to receive an 
antitrust exemption. 
• R&D Joint Ventures. Similar to the case of agricultural cooperatives, the coopera-
tion of rivals to achieve efficiencies in R&D can raise antitrust issues. Under the 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306) certain of 
those activities are exempt from challenge as per se illegal and antitrust’s treble 
damage rule is called off. 
• Sports Leagues. Sport leagues consist of competing teams that must cooperate in 
order to have a viable league. There have been numerous antitrust cases in sports 
because of the peculiar combination of competition and cooperation needed for a 
successful league. Today sports leagues often start as a separate single firm so as 
to avoid antitrust challenge. When Curt Flood sued baseball commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn to try to end baseball’s reserve clause, the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the antitrust laws did not apply to baseball (though they apply to other sports) 
(Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)). The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (15 
U.S.C. § 1291) allows leagues to act as one entity in negotiations with the media 
without antitrust liability. 
• Ocean Shipping. International cartels set rates for certain ocean shipping routes. 
Entry is not typically controlled, though on some routes entry is unlikely. The in-
dustry’s antitrust exemption (46 U.S.C. § 1706) is sometimes defended (Pirrong 
(1992)) on the grounds that the core does not exist and that, without the cartel, 
chaos would reign with frequent bankruptcies and unreliable service. 
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• Webb-Pomerene. Added in 1918, this act allows cartels to set the price for ex-
ports, presumably on the logic that the antitrust laws do not protect foreign con-
sumers (15 U.S.C. § 61). 
• Colleges. In response to an antitrust suit alleging that the top colleges agreed on a 
financial aid formula to use to give out scholarship aid, Congress passed the 
Higher Education Amendments of 1992 (Pub.L. 102-235) to allow colleges to 
agree on a common formula for financial aid free of possible antitrust liability 
without allowing colleges to discuss aid for any particular applicant. 
• Professional Societies. Many societies such as those involving doctors and law-
yers have the ability to influence entry into their profession. Although Profes-
sional Engineers (435 U.S. 679 (1978)) has limited the scope of the exemption, it 
is still the case for example that medical societies control the number of doctors 
by specialty and limit the number of medical schools that can receive accredita-
tion. The professional societies are given this exemption because they are also 
regulating the quality of the profession. In a recent antitrust attack on parts of the 
medical profession, a group of residents brought an antitrust suit aimed at the 
medical schools, teaching hospitals and professional societies for the medical 
residency system. In that system, doctors seeking advanced training are assigned 
one hospital to work at. There is limited competition for the resident. Legislation 
(Section 207 of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-218)) was 
passed to declare that no antitrust liability results from the administration of the 
medical residency system, but the original litigation continues. 
• Labor. Unfavorable court decisions led eventually to the labor exemption. In 
1908, the Supreme Court found a union liable under the antitrust laws for organiz-
ing a boycott of a particular firm’s product (Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 
(1908)). This decision caused labor to pressure Congress to declare in 1914 in the 
Clayton Act that labor organizations were exempt from the antitrust laws. A sub-
sequent decision (Duplex Printing Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 433 (1920)) 
found that the unions could still be liable if they assisted other unions at another 
firm. This led to pressure to pass the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932 which re-
Carlton & Picker Antitrust and Regulation 15 
moved virtually all jurisdiction over labor from the federal courts (Benson et al. 
(1987)).2 
 
As a mechanism to establish an efficient competition policy, the use of immunities may 
be socially desirable in those instances where some collective action is needed for effi-
ciency. Although some immunities may be described that way, others confer market 
power on the exempted industries to the detriment of society.  
II. Control over Rates: The Rise of Antitrust and the Regulation of Railroads 
We return to the early period of antitrust and regulation because it illustrates the interac-
tion between explicit regulation and the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act was passed three 
years after the Commerce Act. The interaction between the two and the results of that 
interaction not only illustrate the economic forces at work that we have discussed, but 
also have shaped the subsequent development of competition policy for the century. The 
history highlights the early view of regulation and antitrust as substitutes for each other 
with a recognition that the two might interact through unforeseen ways. 
The Interstate Commerce Act was adopted on February 4, 1887. The new law ad-
dressed the operation of interstate railroads and limited rates to those that were “reason-
able and just.” The statute barred more general “unjust discrimination” and “undue or 
unreasonable preferences,” and made unlawful long-haul/short-haul discrimination. The 
act also addressed directly competition among railroads by barring contracts among com-
peting railroads for the pooling of freight traffic. 
Pools dividing freight and profit had been common before the passage of the Com-
merce Act and indeed had been created openly in an effort to control competition among 
                                                 
2 This pattern of legislation and antitrust interacting, and specifically an antitrust case being a stimulus for either 
immunity or regulation applies also to other industries that we do not discuss herein. For example, the Southeastern 
Underwriters case (322 U.S. 533 (1944)) found that insurance companies had antitrust liability for rate agreements 
even in states that regulated rates. This discussion led to the passage of the McCarron-Ferguson Act, granting antitrust 
immunity where states regulated insurance. Similarly, Otter Tail (410 U.S. 366 (1973)) found antitrust liability for an 
electric utility company for failure to interconnect with another utility even though the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) could order such interconnection. The Court ruled that the FPC’s powers were too limited. This decision led to 
legislation giving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the renamed FPC) greater powers to force interconnec-
tion. 
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railroads (Grodinsky (1950)). The structure of the railroad business prior to the Com-
merce Act created incentives to raise and stabilize rates through cartels and pools (Hilton 
(1966)). The number of railroads competing on a particular route was usually small and 
fixed costs were high. The former meant that the costs of agreeing and monitoring that 
agreement were relatively low. The irreversibility of the investments in the track meant 
that competitors were locked into place and couldn’t exit if the level of demand wouldn’t 
support multiple competitors. Absent cartels, the incentive to have rate wars was great. 
We can think of the initial regulation of railroads as a search for an institutional struc-
ture that protected shippers from monopoly power and discrimination while making it 
possible for railroad investors to earn competitive rates of return. The Interstate Com-
merce Act limited competition among railroads, while also protecting local shippers 
against perceived discrimination in rates. (Whether this was a net plus or minus for the 
railroads is an issue we do not address here—for a discussion of this issue see Gilligan, 
Marshall & Weingast (1989)). The Sherman Act was passed three years after the Com-
merce Act, without a clear indication of how the two Acts should interact. We now turn 
to that interaction and its consequences. 
A. The Interaction of the Sherman Act with the Interstate Commerce Act—The Problem 
of Trans-Missouri 
The Sherman Act said nothing specific about railroads. Did the Sherman Act cover rail-
roads, too, or should we think that the more specific, if somewhat earlier, provisions of 
the Interstate Commerce Act controlled? These questions were posed to the courts in 
January, 1892, when the United States brought an action to dissolve the Trans-Missouri 
Freight Association. The Trans-Missouri Association had been formed in March of 1889 
as a joint rate-setting organization. While Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act 
barred contracts regarding pooling of freight or division of profits, it said nothing about 
rate-setting organizations. Indeed, the Trans-Missouri group filed its agreement with the 
ICC as required by Section 6 of the Commerce Act. 
The Supreme Court decided Trans-Missouri on March 22, 1897. In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court rejected both the idea that railroads were somehow exempt from the Sherman 
Act given the more direct regulatory structure set forth in the Commerce Act and that the 
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Sherman Act condemned only unreasonable restraints of trade. Understanding the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act to have meant what it “plainly imports”—condemning all re-
straints of trade—the Court condemned the private rate-setting of the railroad association 
and squarely inserted the Sherman Act into the everyday economic life of the country. 
Where did that leave rate-setting for railroads? Two months later, on May 24, 1897, 
the Court announced its opinion in Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway 
(167 U.S. 479 (1897)). That case considered whether the ICC had the power to set rates. 
Yes, the Commerce Act required rates to be “reasonable and just” and declared unrea-
sonable and unjust rates unlawful. Yes, the Interstate Commerce Commission was to en-
force the act, but the statute only expressly authorized the commission to issue a cease-
and-desist order. The Supreme Court held that the ICC could do no more than that and 
that the ICC lacked the affirmative power to set rates. The power to set rates, said the 
Court, was “a legislative, and not an administrative or judicial, function” and given the 
stakes, that meant that “Congress has transferred such a power to any administrative body 
is not to be presumed or implied from any doubtful and uncertain language.” 
So Trans-Missouri turned private collective railroad rate-setting into an antitrust vio-
lation, and under the Cincinnati ruling, the ICC could do no more than reject rates. 
Where would rate-setting authority lie? The Sherman Act was to be enforced in the 
courts, and through its decisions, the Supreme Court had severely constrained the ICC 
(Rabin (1986)). At one level, the Trans-Missouri decision dominated railroad and anti-
trust policy for the next decade; at another level, the decision was largely irrelevant. As 
to the latter, the Interstate Commerce Commission stated in its 1901 Annual Report: 
It is not the businesses of this Commission to enforce the anti-trust act, and 
we express no opinion as to the legality of the means adopted by these asso-
ciations. We simply call attention to the fact that the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in the Trans-Missouri case and the Joint Traffic Asso-
ciation case has produced no practical effect upon the railway operations of 
the country. Such associations, in fact, exist now as they did before those de-
cisions, and with the same general effect. In justice to all parties we ought 
probably to add that it is difficult to see how our interstate railways could be 
operated, with due regard to the interests of the shipper and the railway, with-
out concerted action of the kind afforded to these associations. 
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But in another way, the Trans-Missouri decision framed the country’s consideration 
of the trust question and the related question of how to grapple with large agglomerations 
of capital, as Sklar (1988) demonstrates in his history of the period. This decision seem-
ingly satisfied no one. 
B. Solving Trans-Missouri 
If the ICC was right—if the economic structure of railroads required coordinated rate-
setting, either privately or through the government—the path forward was through re-
vised legislation. Theodore Roosevelt had become president when McKinley was assas-
sinated in September 1901. In February 1903, Roosevelt moved forward on two fronts. 
The Elkins Act of 1903 gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the independent au-
thority to seek relief in federal courts in situations in which railroads were charging less 
than published rates or were engaging in forbidden discrimination. Under the original 
Commerce Act, the ICC could act only on the petition of an injured party. The Elkins Act 
increased the ICC’s power, but it still didn’t have an independent rate-setting power. 
Three years later, the Hepburn Act of 1906 took a first step in that direction. It added oil 
pipelines to the substantive scope of the act, and gave the ICC the power to set maximum 
rates, once it had found a prior rate unjust and unreasonable. 
But Roosevelt, unwilling to rely solely on the Sherman Act to control general compe-
tition policy, was also looking for a way to exert more regulatory pressure on the rest of 
the economy. On February 14, 1903, Congress created a new executive department to be 
known as the Department of Commerce and Labor. Within the new department, the stat-
ute created the Bureau of Corporations. The bureau was designed to be an investigatory 
body with power to subpoena whose mission was to investigate any corporation engaged 
in interstate commerce to produce information and recommendations for legislation. But 
all of this information was to flow through the President who in turn had the power to 
release industries from scrutiny. Railroads were expressly excluded. The design of the 
Bureau of Corporations matched Roosevelt’s conception of the presidency as the bully 
pulpit. The bureau would give Roosevelt the information that he needed to go to the pub-
lic or to Congress, plus the fact that the release of the information was within Roosevelt’s 
power gave Roosevelt leverage in negotiations with corporations. 
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After winning the presidency in 1906, Roosevelt continued to pursue his progressive 
agenda. Roosevelt called for an expansion of federal control over railroads—greater con-
trol over entry and issuance of securities, while allowing private railroad agreements on 
rates subject to approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission. At the same time, 
Roosevelt wanted a broad expansion in federal powers over large corporations engaged 
in interstate activities. He called for a federal incorporation law, or a federal licensing act, 
or some combination of the two. But by 1909, the Hepburn Bill, Roosevelt’s vehicle for 
these changes, was dead in committee, and with it died Roosevelt’s attempt for greater 
direct federal regulation of competition policy. 
William Howard Taft succeeded Roosevelt as President in 1909. Taft supported the 
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, which created a new, limited-subject matter jurisdiction court, 
the United States Court of Commerce. It was staffed with five judges from the federal 
judiciary. The new Commerce Court was given exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from 
ICC orders and appeals from the Commerce Court went to the Supreme Court. 
Consider the Commerce Court in light of our prior general analysis of the choice be-
tween agencies and courts. Our discussion above suggested that federal courts of general 
jurisdiction would be poorly situated to deal with network industries. As Frankfurter and 
Landis (1928, p. 154) recognized, federal courts of general jurisdiction resulted in “con-
flicts in court decisions begetting territorial diversity where unified treatment of a prob-
lem is demanded, nullification by a single judge, even temporarily, of legislative or ad-
ministrative action affecting whole sections of the country.” A federal court of special-
ized jurisdiction would make possible many of the benefits of agencies—in particular, 
the ability to make coherent, contemporaneous decisions—while creating more inde-
pendence than an agency would have. 
The new Commerce Court took over a large number of cases then spread throughout 
the federal judiciary. The court was instantly busy and, almost as quickly, reviled by the 
public (Ripley, 1910). The Commerce Court became the flashpoint for the “railroad prob-
lem”; as Frankfurter and Landis (1928, p.164) put it, “(p)robably no court has ever been 
called upon to adjudicate so large a volume of litigation of as far-reaching import in so 
brief a time.” 
20  October 12, 2006 
The Commerce Court failed. The public saw the ICC as protecting shoppers from the 
power of the railroads, while the Commerce Court frequently overturned ICC decisions 
to the detriment of shippers. As Kolko (1965, p. 199) puts it in describing a series of 
Commerce Court decisions that were seen to benefit the railroads, “… the Commerce 
Court proceeded to make itself the most unpopular judicial institution in a nation then in 
the process of attacking the sanctity of the courts.” When Woodrow Wilson became 
President, he quickly signed legislation ending the Commerce Court, which came to final 
death on December 31, 1913. Its demise illustrates the power of shippers to protect them-
selves in ways that antitrust could not. 
Wilson’s presidency brings the process of structural reform to a close. The Supreme 
Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil had already muted some of the pressure for anti-
trust reform. That decision abandoned the literalism of Trans-Missouri and introduced 
(restored?) the common law distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints 
of trade. (And, by the way, also broke up Standard Oil.) Early in his first term, on Janu-
ary 20, 1914, Wilson delivered a special message to Congress on antitrust. Wilson had 
two principal aims. First he wanted to make explicit the nature of antitrust violations: 
Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual processes and methods of 
monopoly and of the many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition possi-
ble—at any rate up to the limits of what practice has disclosed. These prac-
tices, being now abundantly disclosed, can be explicitly and item by item for-
bidden by statute in such terms as will practically eliminate uncertainty, the 
law itself and the penalty being made equally plain. 
 
Wilson then turned to the idea of an interstate trade commission: 
And the businessman of the country desire something more than that the men-
ace of legal process in these matters be made explicit and intelligible. They 
desire the advice, the definite guidance and information which can be supplied 
by administrative body, an interstate trade commission. 
 
Later that year, Wilson got exactly what he wanted with the enactment of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and the Clayton Act. Adopted on September 26, 1914, 
the FTCA brought to a close Roosevelt’s efforts to extend the Interstate Commerce Act 
to the general economy. The Bureau of Corporations, designed by Roosevelt as the Presi-
dent’s private investigatory arm, was to become the back-office of the new Federal Trade 
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Commission. The Commission itself was to parallel the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion: an independent agency of five commissioners appointed by the President on the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. 
Section 5 of the FTCA declared unlawful “unfair methods of competition” and em-
powered the FTC to prevent the use of such methods other than by banks, subject to the 
new banking act, and common carriers subject to the Commerce Act. In so doing, Section 
5 tracked the Commerce Act in two ways: the FTCA focused on unfairness—typically 
measured by comparing the treatment of two similarly situated market participants—
while denying broader rate-setting power to the FTC. And the Clayton Act forbade spe-
cific practices, including tying and price discrimination. So Wilson got the specificity he 
wanted through the Clayton Act, and a general regulatory agency devoted to all industry 
through his new Federal Trade Commission. Industry would have a regulatory agency 
that it could turn to and perhaps even influence. The FTC, unlike industry-specific regu-
latory bodies, deals with industry in general. Perhaps this explains why, at least today, we 
are unaware of claims that the FTC has been captured by any industry or special interest 
group. Its structure raises the issue as to whether a combination of antitrust and industry-
specific regulation in one agency, as occurs today in Australia or Europe for certain func-
tions, is desirable—an issue we leave for future research. 
*** 
With the 1914 legislation, the key institutional features that still dominate U.S. anti-
trust law were established: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. The bal-
ance between antitrust and regulation still had to be worked out. The resolution of the 
issue of Trans-Missouri still would take some time. The Transportation Act of 1920—
finally—gave the Interstate Commerce Commission full control over rates, requiring the 
Commission to ensure that rates permitted carriers to receive “a fair return upon the ag-
gregate value of the railway property of such carriers held for and used in the service of 
transportation.” As to the fight over whether antitrust or regulation ultimately controlled 
rate setting for railroads, in 1948, more than a half-century after the Supreme Court’s 
original decision in Trans-Missouri, Congress finally put the decision to rest by exempt-
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ing joint setting of railroad rates from the antitrust laws, so long as the ICC approved the 
rates.3 
III. Interconnection in Network Industries 
We now jump from the formative years of the creation of competition policy to more re-
cent times. Just as the initial battles between regulation and the Sherman Act illustrate the 
battle between antitrust and regulation as two methods to control competition, so too do 
more recent events—particularly the recent shift away from regulation to reliance on the 
Sherman Act. We focus our attention on network industries, since those are the ones 
where the case for regulation was often thought to be the strongest. If rate-setting was the 
first great issue of competition policy for network industries, the leading issue today is 
interconnection and mandatory access.4 
This recent history highlights a move away from regulation towards antitrust as a 
means to control competition and reveals how regulation and antitrust can be both substi-
tutes and, in some settings, complements. The substitution involves the complete re-
placement of regulation with antitrust, as occurs when industries become deregulated 
(e.g., airlines and trucks). The complementarity between regulation and antitrust can arise 
in two ways. In an industry that becomes partially deregulated, antitrust can be used to 
control the unregulated segments, while regulation controls the rest. Indeed, partial de-
regulation of an industry can increase the importance to a rival’s survival of rules of in-
terconnection. 
In structuring an efficient partial deregulation of an industry, the assignment of tasks 
to antitrust versus regulation is key. We shouldn’t ask antitrust and federal judges to per-
form tasks for which they are ill-suited—namely price setting and crafting affirmative 
duties because those tasks require specialized industry knowledge that judges lack. If we 
need government involvement in those tasks, they should be assigned to regulators with 
specialized industry knowledge, though in making that judgment we need to recognize 
                                                 
3 Pub. L. 80-662, 62 Stat. 472 (June 17, 1948). 
4 The issue of interconnection is much more general than the text indicates because it applies to any industry (not 
just network industries) in which one firm relies on a rival for an input or in which a rival can influence the conditions 
of the input supply of another firm. The Microsoft case provides a good illustration.  
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the inefficiencies that can arise as regulators cater to special interests or make mistakes. 
That is an especially strong problem in industries undergoing rapid technological change, 
where mistakes can impose huge costs. But it may be a mistake to just trump antitrust 
entirely, as we should fear capture of regulators, and that leads to a second type of com-
plementarity. 
The second form of complementarity between antitrust and regulation involves the 
use of antitrust as a constraint on how regulation is implemented. This is often imple-
mented through a double filter or double-veto process, as we see in telecommunications 
mergers. The FCC evaluates telecom mergers under a public interest standard and that 
empowers the FCC to consider a wider range of issues than we typically entrust to fed-
eral judges. This would include, for example, whether and how to implement cross-
subsidies. But given the fear of regulatory capture, we apply a second, antitrust filter to 
these mergers by allowing the Department of Justice to sue under the antitrust laws to 
block an anticompetitive merger that the FCC has approved. Exactly how much scrutiny 
should be applied to regulatory decisions turns on a trade-off between allowing expertise 
to work—FCC expertise and knowledge—versus fearing biased decision-making from an 
agency subject to capture. Even if no antitrust suit occurs, the threat of such a suit can 
influence FCC policy. 
In this section, we address the fundamental question that has occupied and continues 
to occupy regulatory and antitrust decisions in network industries: how should those mar-
kets be structured and specifically how should firms interact in those industries? We fo-
cus our analysis on telecommunications and transportation (planes, trains and trucks), 
though we note that interconnection issues are important in other industries such as elec-
tricity, where generators must have access to the transmission grid.  
As already explained, a regulation may allow elevated pricing in return for some 
other objective that the regulator is likely to have to satisfy, such as a cross subsidy to 
different customer groups. But in order to achieve its objectives, the regulator may need 
to also control entry. Otherwise there may be no way to maintain the elevated price. This 
means that the regulator wants to limit competition and for that reason will be hostile to 
being constrained by the antitrust laws. 
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The regulators’ concern with entry is especially acute in network industries in which 
firms must interconnect with each other, such as airlines, trucking, electricity, railroads, 
and telecommunications. In such industries, the regulator needs to administer the price 
and quality of the interconnection. If two firms compete in the end market and one com-
petitor supplies the other a key input, the regulator must worry that the supplier will mis-
use its control over the input to harm his rival. This concern vanishes if the regulated 
firms are not allowed to vertically integrate. In the absence of regulation, competition 
would likely lead to massive vertical and horizontal merger and a concentrated market 
structure. In contrast, regulation should lead to many vertically disintegrated firms. (See 
Carlton and Klamer (1983)). 
Moreover when regulated firms must interconnect, the price of interconnection will 
typically be regulated to be above marginal cost. If so, there will be an efficiency motiva-
tion for a firm to vertically integrate to avoid double marginalization. But such mergers 
would eliminate firms and ultimately lead to one firm. Regulators might prefer to avoid 
this outcome to prevent one firm from becoming a potent political force in regulatory bat-
tles.5 By observing what happens when regulations are lifted, we can get a sense for why 
it was important for the regulators to constrain the forces of competition. We look at a 
few regulated network industries below. They all show a similar pattern: after either par-
tial or complete deregulation, there is massive consolidation, increased industry concen-
tration, an end to cross subsidy, often a decline in employment or wages, and a fall in 
price. Deregulation can be seen as the result of a consensus that regulation imposed high 
costs on the economy and that courts are sensibly applying the antitrust laws. Indeed, 
there is a recognition that the use of economics has revolutionized and made more sensi-
ble the antitrust laws.6 In light of the costs of regulation and the improvement in antitrust, 
a movement away from regulation towards antitrust has occurred. In this view, regulation 
                                                 
5 In an industry with high sunk costs but low marginal costs, interconnection fees based on models of contesta-
bility fail to reward carriers adequately for risk, since contestability ignores sunk costs. In such situations, not only is 
price above marginal cost, but investment is deterred. This may have been the case in telecommunications. See 
Pindyck (2005). 
6 As Posner (2003) explains in the preface to the second edition of his primer Antitrust Law: 
Much of antitrust law in 1976 was an intellectual disgrace. Today, antitrust law is a body of economically rational 
principles largely though not entirely congruent with the principles set forth in the first edition. The chief worry at 
present is not doctrine or direction, but implementation ... . 
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and antitrust are substitutes. But in some cases we also see regulation and antitrust being 
used together in an industry, illustrating the possible complementarity use of the two. 
A. Telecommunications 
1. EARLY INTERCONNECTION BATTLES 
The telephone system is about interconnection, as a single-phone phone system is worth-
less. In the early days of the industry, as Mueller (1997) describes, different local compa-
nies competed with each other. A customer of one company could reach other customers 
of only that company; you might need to have multiple phones to reach everyone. (This 
is very much like instant messaging today, where America Online has resisted attempts 
by Yahoo, Microsoft and others to create a unified IM system.) American Telephone and 
Telegraph—the Bell System—was the dominant firm of the day, but local competition 
was widespread; indeed, during the early 1900s, half of the cities with populations larger 
than 5,000 had competing local firms (Mueller, p. 81). This competition almost certainly 
had benefits—on price and service—but came with a loss of network externalities. 
AT&T set out to build a universal system and started by purchasing competing telephone 
companies. 
In 1912, that led to an antitrust suit in Portland, Oregon and to calls by the Postmaster 
General to nationalize the telephone and telegraph system—presumably to unify the mes-
saging systems of the day (postal, telegraph and phone) into one set of hands. Faced with 
these two threats, AT&T agreed to, in the words of N.C. Kingsbury, an AT&T vice-
president, to “set its house in order.” In what is now known as the Kingsbury Commit-
ment, AT&T agreed to divest itself of control over Western Union; to stop acquisitions of 
competing lines; and to give access to Bell’s long distance lines to competing local phone 
companies, that is, to interconnect the Bell system’s long distance lines with the local 
competitor’s network.7 
The Kingsbury Commitment might be framed as a victory for local phone competi-
tion but for two factors. First, few phone users made long-distance calls, so the local 
                                                 
7 See “Government Accepts an Offer of Complete Separation,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 1913, p. 1 (setting forth 
terms of Kingsbury Commitment). 
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line/long-distance line interconnection may not have been an important competitive fac-
tor. Second, the size of the local network did matter, and AT&T aggressively moved for-
ward on local interconnection, something outside the scope of the Kingsbury Commit-
ment. 
As is so often the case, antitrust action—here the settlement—sets the stage for the 
next round of legislation and that emerged in the form of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921. 
The new law entrusted telephone mergers to the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
authorized approval if doing so would “be of advantage to the persons to whom service is 
rendered and in the public interest.” The Act also displaced the antitrust laws: once the 
ICC had said yes, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission could do 
nothing. With the new act in place, AT&T moved swiftly to create local interconnection 
through acquisition, with the ICC approving 271 of 274 AT&T acquisitions over a thir-
teen-year period (Starr, 2004, p. 209). 
2. INTERCONNECTION AGAIN: MCI’S ENTRY INTO LONG DISTANCE 
We jump ahead to consider the entry of MCI into long distance. We start with a single 
integrated phone system, with local and long-distance controlled by AT&T. MCI entered 
in a very limited way, by building microwave towers to enable private within-firm phone 
calls between St. Louis and Chicago (say between Walgreens’s home office in Chicago 
and a district office in St. Louis). MCI didn’t need access to the public network to make 
this work. Even this limited entry required an initial 1959 order and a subsequent 1969 
ruling from the Federal Communications Commission. 
Unlike entry into private lines, entry into the public market for long distance required 
MCI to interconnect with AT&T, or in the alternative, simultaneous entry by MCI into 
local and long-distance. And if MCI had been forced to build the entire network, it could 
not likely have entered the market. The local network was seen as a natural monopoly. It 
clearly would have been inefficient to build a second local network—that just says again 
that the local network was a natural monopoly—and it was also probably the case that it 
was a money-losing proposition for MCI to build a local network. 
Bundling entry—forcing MCI to enter on the scale of having to build a local network 
if it wanted to enter the long-distance business—would probably have prevented the 
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long-distance entry. Unbundling entry—giving MCI access to the local network while 
allowing entry only in long-distance—meant that MCI could just compare the much more 
limited capital costs of building the second piece with the profits associated with that 
piece rather than the costs of both pieces with the profits associated with both pieces. 
MCI moved against AT&T on both regulatory and antitrust fronts. In 1970, the FCC 
had concluded that some entry was appropriate, but when push came to shove, the FCC 
back-tracked. In February 1978, the FCC rejected MCI’s request that AT&T be ordered 
to provide local physical interconnections for MCI’s intended public long-distance ser-
vice. AT&T successfully persuaded the FCC that MCI would target high-profit routes 
and that that would destabilize the existing structure of rates, contrary to the public inter-
est. MCI successfully appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which concluded that the conse-
quences of entry could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In a subsequent proceeding, 
in 1978, the D.C. Circuit ordered AT&T to make interconnection for MCI’s long-
distance service. 
MCI filed a private antitrust suit against AT&T in 1974. That case eventually went to 
a jury trial in the first half of 1980. The jury ultimately found AT&T liable on ten of fif-
teen charges, and awarded $600 million in actual damages, then trebled to $1.8 billion 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. On interconnection, MCI successfully argued that 
AT&T’s refusal to interconnect constituted an impermissible refusal of access to an es-
sential facility. The Seventh Circuit sustained the jury finding that that refusal constituted 
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
We should step back from the details of this fight over entry and interconnection to 
focus on the interaction between regulation and antitrust. In general we know that regula-
tion can lead to cross subsidy. Cross subsidies create entry incentives. General antitrust 
law will often facilitate entry but will do so with little regard for the cross-subsidy issues. 
MCI’s entry into long distance probably fits in this framework. The D.C. Circuit ex-
pressly considered the cross-subsidy issues as part of its review of the FCC’s regulatory 
proceedings, but concluded that those issues could be dealt with in subsequent proceed-
ings. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, faced with antitrust claims (and not regulatory 
claims) couldn’t consider what its interconnection ruling might mean for the existing set 
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of cross-subsidized rates. This is an excellent illustration of the use of antitrust in a regu-
lated industry to control competition, where antitrust constrains what regulation can do. 
Whether we should have welcomed MCI’s entry is a separate question. To assess 
that, we need to assess what goals the regulators were pursuing and if those goals were 
sensible. MCI’s entry precipitated a decline in long distance rates. If prior to that decline, 
the regulators were pursuing the “public interest,” then MCI’s entry constrained the regu-
lators from pursuing their desired policy. If we start with a regulated monopolist offering 
services to different customers, the regulator will need to set prices for each group of cus-
tomers. The standard response in theory is Ramsey pricing. The regulator sets a series of 
prices—prices for long distance and for local service, for business customers and con-
sumers, for urban and rural users—to minimize social loss while hitting a revenue target. 
The Ramsey approach is about allocating the fixed costs of production among the differ-
ent groups using the service. The simple theory says that inelastic demanders should pay 
a larger share of the fixed costs. Inelastic demanders won’t change their purchases much 
in the face of higher charges, and it is the reduced consumption when we push prices 
above marginal cost that causes the social loss. So elastic demanders should not bear too 
many fixed costs, inelastic demanders should pay a big chunk of those costs. 
Now assume that we have put Ramsey prices into place. Those prices can create arbi-
trage opportunities: indeed, the whole vision behind Ramsey pricing is that inelastic de-
manders bear the brunt of fixed costs, while elastic demanders bear few of those costs. 
Ramsey pricing is precisely about price discrimination. If the regulators got the prices 
“right” in the first instance, entry that emerges because of regulator-created price gaps 
that get eliminated by the entry, is entry we do not want if we accept the regulators’ 
goals. This concern with “cream skimming” was prevalent in contemplating long-
distance entry. 
The regulators may not have implemented Ramsey prices in the first instance, but 
they clearly had created an elaborate pattern of cross-subsidies, and that pattern would 
become more difficult to sustain after entry. How should we evaluate entry, whether fa-
cilities-based competition or otherwise, where the entry opportunity is created by cross-
subsidy driven pricing? To some extent, this requires a political account—a public choice 
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account—about the nature of subsidies. If we thought that the subsidies were appropriate, 
then we should bar entry occurring just because of the opportunity created by the cross 
subsidy. So if the incumbent charges a higher price in urban areas than costs would war-
rant but does so because of a requirement that the price structure force urban users to sub-
sidize rural users, entry targeted at urban users should be seen as problematic. In contrast, 
if we think of cross-subsidies as inappropriate, entry may be useful in that it may make 
those subsidies unsustainable.  
3. THE 1996 ACT’S INTERCONNECTION RULES AND TRINKO8 
With the rise of AT&T’s dominance, despite the passage of the Communications Act of 
1934, antitrust became the main vehicle for altering the structure of AT&T. In 1949, the 
federal government brought an antitrust action against AT&T, which, in turn, resulted in 
a 1956 consent decree and final judgment. In 1974, the government brought a new action 
against AT&T, and in 1982, a new consent decree emerged as a modification of the 1956 
decree. That decree resulted in the break up of AT&T: long-distance was separated from 
local and regional local companies were established. (Though we will not discuss it, the 
break-up of AT&T has received much attention. See Noll and Owen (1989).) 
We want to focus on the next important event, namely the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. The 1996 Act is wide-ranging but we address only its efforts to produce local 
competition through interconnection policy and focus on the interaction of antitrust and 
regulation. The 1996 Act seeks to facilitate competition in local telephone markets by 
making it easier for entrants to compete with incumbents. It does so by creating a series 
of mandatory dealing obligations, that is, ways in which the incumbent is required to 
share its facilities with an entrant. This includes an obligation of interconnection; a re-
quirement to sell telecommunications services to an entrant at wholesale prices, so that 
the entrant can resell those services at retail; and an obligation to unbundle its local net-
work and sell access to pieces of the network at a cost-based price. 
As to the intersection of the 1996 Act and antitrust, the 1996 Act contains a “savings” 
clause: 
                                                 
8 Carlton has served as a consultant for major telecommunications companies including Verizon, and consulted on 
Trinko. 
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Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act ... shall be construed 
to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws. 
(47 U.S.C. § 152, Historical and Statutory Notes.) 
In January 2004, the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Trinko. AT&T wanted 
to enter Verizon’s local markets in New York and sought access pursuant to the terms of 
the then-applicable rules under the 1996 Act. When the access granted was seen as in-
adequate, both state and federal communications regulators acted and monetary penalties 
were imposed against Verizon. Enter Curtis Trinko, a New York lawyer. He brought an 
antitrust class action against Verizon alleging that, as a local customer of AT&T, he was 
injured by Verizon’s actions and that those actions violated Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. The federal district court would have none of that and booted the complaint, but the 
Second Circuit reversed. 
Justice Scalia, for the Court, noted that the situation seemed to call for an implicit an-
titrust immunity. The 1996 Act created interconnection duties and those duties could be 
enforced—and were enforced here—through the appropriate regulators. That would seem 
to suffice, and there would be some risk that additional antitrust enforcement would inter-
fere with the regulatory scheme. So the Court might have held, but for the savings clause, 
which precluded such a claim of implicit immunity. 
Instead, the Court turned to the question of whether antitrust law, as distinct from 
regulation, imposed on Verizon a duty to deal with entrants. Antitrust rarely imposes 
mandatory obligations, other than as a remedy for an independent antitrust violation. The 
Aspen Skiing case represents one prominent exception to that statement, and whatever the 
merits of Aspen (see Carlton (2001) for criticism), the Court saw little reason to expand 
mandatory obligations here. Indeed, just the opposite: “The 1996 Act’s extensive provi-
sion for access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access.” The 
Court ruled that the antitrust laws imposed no duty to deal on Verizon. 
The savings clause reflects the idea of antitrust and regulation as complementary 
mechanisms to control competition. As suggested in the introduction to this section, Con-
gress might want to implement complementarity as a way of imposing a check on the 
regulatory agents that implement particular industry legislation. The continuing applica-
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bility of antitrust law notwithstanding, the existence of industry-specific legislation im-
poses limits on how far industry regulators can deviate from the principles at stake in an-
titrust. The difficulty is in implementing that idea in a particular situation. In Trinko it-
self, the Court recognized that antitrust has only weakly embraced affirmative duties, 
with Aspen Skiing seemingly representing the outer limits for antitrust itself. Given anti-
trust’s own deficits in the area of affirmative dealing, the Court wisely decided that 
Trinko would have represented a particularly poor situation to try to use antitrust to po-
lice errant telcom regulators. 
B. Airlines 
Congress established the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which later became the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB), in 1938. The CAB regulated fares and entry. They cross-
subsidized low-density short-haul routes with revenues from low-cost long-haul routes. 
The CAB rarely allowed mergers unless bankruptcy was imminent (Morrison and 
Winston (2000), p. 9). By the 1970s, the CAB began to allow entry. Several airlines were 
in the process of initiating lawsuits against the CAB for violating its Congressional man-
date, when the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed. (Interestingly, the largest 
domestic carrier at the time, United, favored deregulation.) Airline regulation was phased 
out and the CAB was abolished in 1984 (see Carlton and Perloff (2005)). 
In response to widespread criticism of regulation, airline competition was deregulated 
and controlled only by antitrust. Deregulation set in motion forces that are still working 
their way through the airline system. Fares fell substantially after deregulation with typi-
cal estimates being 20% or more (see e.g., Morrison and Winston (2000, p. 2)). The menu 
of fares on a typical route grew. Cross subsidies were eliminated (the CAB had elimi-
nated cross subsidies based on distance in the 1970s). There has been a virtual flood of 
entry and exit since deregulation. For example, of the 58 carriers that began operations 
between 1978 and 1990, only one (America West) is still operating (Morrison and 
Winston (2000, p. 9)). 
Airlines developed hub-and-spoke networks (with Southwest being a notable excep-
tion) through merger and internal expansion and as a result reduced their need to rely on 
another airline for interconnection. For example, in 1979 25% of trips involved connec-
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tions and of those 39% involved another airline. By 1989, there were more connecting 
flights as a result of the hub-and-spoke system, with the effect being that 33% of trips 
involved connections and of those less than 5% involved an interconnection with another 
airline. 
There was considerable merger activity and agreements among airlines to cooperate 
on flight schedules and the setting of through-fares when a passenger travels on two air-
lines to reach his final destination. (These agreements are called alliances or code-sharing 
agreements.) The Department of Justice challenged several mergers and alliances and its 
opposition recently ended the attempt of United to merge with US Air, and also ended the 
proposed alliances between American and US Air and between Delta and United.9 
As a result of mergers and firm expansion, concentration has risen nationally. The 
four-firm concentration ratio has risen from 56% in 1977 to 71% in 2003 (Wessel 
(2004)). But concentration at hubs has behaved very differently than concentration at 
non-hubs. At hub airports, the HHI rose from a median of under 2200 pre-deregulation to 
a median of 3700 by 1989, while at non-hub airports, the HHI fell from 3200 in 1979 to 
about 2200 in 1989 (Bamberger and Carlton (2002)). 
Despite regulation, airlines proved to be a poor investment. During regulation, espe-
cially the 1970s, service competition eroded a significant portion of airline earnings. 
Since deregulation, fierce price competition has led to the bankruptcy of several airlines 
and indeed several major airlines were recently either in bankruptcy or are close to it. 
(“As of 1992 ..., the money that has been made since the dawn of aviation by all of this 
country’s airline companies has been zero. .... . If I’d been at Kitty Hawk in 1903, I 
would have been farsighted enough and public spirited enough—I owed this to future 
capitalist—to shoot him down.” Warren Buffet as reported in Wessel (2004)). Deregula-
tion also led to lower wages for employees and increased productivity. 
The behavior of the airline industry post-deregulation illustrates that a once regulated 
industry may be prone to antitrust violations in the aftermath of regulation. This could 
occur because collective action is needed for efficiency or simply because firms in the 
industry have gotten used to acting in concert during regulation. We think the airline in-
                                                 
9 Carlton has served as a consultant for the major airlines in mergers and other proceedings. 
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dustry illustrates well the heightened antitrust liability that can attend a network industry 
when it is deregulated. 
Prior to deregulation, airlines relied on each other to interconnect passengers. That 
meant that airlines would have to set some fares jointly and decide how to split the reve-
nue. So, for example, if airline 1 flies from A to B, and airline 2 flies from B to C, the 
two airlines could coordinate their flight times so that a traveler could conveniently go 
from A to C (with a change of plane at B). The two airlines would collectively set a fare 
for A to C travel and share it in some way. Also, airlines, post-regulation, developed so-
phisticated pricing methods requiring booking agents to keep track of multiple fares and 
seat availability. 
This created two problems. First, travel agents needed complex software to allow 
them to book tickets. Second, travel agents had to have up-to-date information on pricing 
and seat availability. Thousands of fares existed and many changed daily. The pricing of 
airlines sometimes involved large swings in price and its pricing is more complicated 
than pricing in many other markets. These characteristics created the incentive for certain 
acts that could achieve efficiencies but might also be used to harm competition. Signifi-
cant antitrust litigation against the airlines ensued post-deregulation.  
The tendency of airlines to cooperate in the setting of through-fares when traffic is 
shared can be a natural and desirable way for two airlines to provide a service to consum-
ers that neither airline, on its own, could provide. It could also be a ploy by which one 
airline bribes another to prevent expansion of competing routes. (If you don’t enter route 
BC, where I fly, I will interline with your AB route and let you keep a large fraction of 
the through-fare from A to C. In that way, you have no incentive to enter BC and com-
pete with me on that route.) This last concern has caused the Department of Justice to 
investigate several proposed domestic airline alliances. And, as already mentioned, these 
investigations have scuttled proposed alliances between American and US Airways, and 
between Delta and United. 
The need to have software to book tickets led to several cases and investigations into 
computer reservation systems (CRS) where the concern was that the CRS system used by 
a travel agent favored the airline that produced the CRS system. So, for example, if a 
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travel agent used the Sabre system originally developed by American Airlines, that sys-
tem displayed information about American Airlines flights more prominently than other 
airlines. As a result of the government investigation, detailed rules on “unbiasedness” 
were agreed to (See GuerinCalvert and Noll (1991)). Today, CRS systems are no longer 
privately owned by the airlines.  
The need to have updates of the massive number of daily fare changes led to a De-
partment of Justice investigation of information sharing amongst the airlines. Most of the 
airlines would provide information each day on all their fares by route. The information 
in a “notes section” would contain relevant fare restrictions (e.g., weekend stays, advance 
purchase requirements) as well as the date the fare became effective and expired. This 
information on fares was transmitted to The Airline Tariff Publishing Company 
(ATPCO) which then made a master computer tape and distributed it to all airlines and 
travel agents. ATPCO was owned by the airlines. 
The Department of Justice alleged that ATPCO was being used as a mechanism to 
coordinate pricing. One allegation was that the notes section was used to communicate 
price signals. So for example if airline 1 cut price on an important route of airline 2, air-
line 2 would retaliate and cut price on an important route of airline 1. To make sure air-
line 1 understood why it had cut fares, airline 2 could put a note to indicate why it had cut 
price in an attempt to convince airline 1 to withdraw its low fares on airline 2’s routes. 
A related allegation was that the first effective and last effective ticket date were used 
to make it easier to coordinate pricing. So, for example, if airline 1 wanted to raise fares, 
it would announce an increase to take effect in say two weeks. If other airlines did not 
match, or only partly matched, airline 1 could rescind or revise its fare increase and not 
suffer any loss of business because the fare increase had not yet gone into effect. The air-
lines denied the government allegations.10 The airlines settled the case by agreeing to 
eliminate extraneous notes and by abandoning the use of first ticket dates. Interestingly, 
analysis of fares post-settlement show no effect from the settlement (Borenstein (2004)). 
The sometimes wild price swings that occur when new entrants start servicing a route 
has led to both litigation and government investigations. In a city pair that can support 
                                                 
10 Carlton worked on behalf of the airlines. 
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only one or a few carriers, competition from a new rival not only can expand capacity a 
lot but can induce responses from the incumbents. In response to an aggressive price and 
output response by an incumbent, allegations of predation are often made. The precise 
definition of predation in an industry such as airlines with large fixed costs on a route but 
small variable costs is not well established, especially on a route where only one carrier 
can survive (Edlin and Farrell (2004)). But the observation that fares frequently plummet 
below levels that are financially viable has led to demands for government intervention. 
In U.S. v. AMR et al. (140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2001), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 
2003)), the Department of Justice accused American Airlines of practicing price preda-
tion. American Airlines competed out of Dallas Fort Worth with several low cost airlines 
(Vanguard, Western Pacific, Sun Jet). American lowered its fares, and increased its seat 
availability in response to these low cost airlines, causing them to abandon their routes. 
After the low cost airlines exited, American reduced the number of flights and raised 
prices to roughly their initial levels. American responded that its prices exceeded average 
variable costs, and moved for summary judgment which was granted.  
Just prior to the Department of Justice case, the Department of Transportation initi-
ated an investigation of predation in the airline industry. It investigated several incidents 
in which it was alleged that incumbents routinely responded to entry of low cost carriers 
by lowering fares, expanding output and driving them out of business, at which point 
fares rose. In a detailed study of entry and exit patterns (submitted to the Department of 
Transportation on behalf of United), Bamberger and Carlton (2006) found that entry and 
exit on routes were extremely common amongst both low cost carriers and established 
carriers. Moreover, with the exception of Southwest Airlines, there were very high exit 
rates amongst both low cost and regular carriers. The Department of Transportation 
dropped its attempt to define predation standards. As an aside, between 2000 and 2005, 
the share of passengers served by low-cost airlines has risen from 23% to 26%. 
C. Railroads11 
As Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast (1989) note, the consequences of the Interstate 
Commerce Act are complex. One view is that it was a mechanism to benefit the railroads. 
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But as with most regulated industries the regulators had other interest groups to satisfy 
and did. Cross subsidy to high-cost, low-density routes and to short-haul shippers 
emerged; indeed, that was one of the central designs of the law, as it banned long-
haul/short-haul discrimination. Price discrimination in which high value-added products 
had higher rates than bulk also emerged to placate certain shipper interest groups. In what 
was to be important later, regulators controlled not only entry but also exit from a route. 
The emergence of the truck (and airplanes) complicated the regulatory calculations. 
Control of trucking became necessary to protect railroads and did occur in the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935. As trucking (especially its union, the Teamsters) developed as its 
own powerful interest group, the interest of railroads waned and railroads got clobbered 
financially, resulting in numerous bankruptcies. Trucks siphoned off the profitable high 
value-added shipments and eroded this source of revenue that railroads used for cross 
subsidy. The restrictions on abandonment of routes created enormous inefficiencies. The 
deregulation of the railroads in 1976 (4R Act) and in 1980 (Staggers Act) removed most 
regulations but placed merger control in the hands of the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB), not the Department of Justice. It streamlined the process for merging. 
After deregulation, there was massive abandonment of track, reductions in employ-
ment, decline in certain rates, and massive consolidation that is still ongoing. Roughly 
one third of tracks was abandoned, real operating costs fell in the 20-year period follow-
ing deregulation by about 60 percent, employment has been estimated to be about 60 per-
cent lower as a result of deregulation (Davis and Wilson (1999)), rail volumes started to 
grow again, and industry profitability improved. Rates fell (Burton (1993)), especially for 
high value-added products, and service improved. 
“Before deregulation, mergers typically involved railroads with substantial parallel 
trackage … . In contrast, mergers in the post-Staggers period have been primarily end-to-
end” (Vellturo et al. (1992), pp. 341-42). Mergers in the first six years of deregulation 
reduced the number of large railroads (Class I) from 36 to 16 (Grimm and Winston 
(2000), pp. 45-46 citing Chaplin and Schmidt (1999)). Continued merger activity has left 
only two railroads servicing the West and also the East (see also Ivaldi and McCullough 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 This section draws heavily from Peltzman (1989) and Grimm and Winston (2000). 
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(2005)). Using figures from the Association of American Railroads, the number of Class 
I railroads declined from 40 in 1980 to 7 in 2004. According to a study by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, the HHI of railroads in the East has increased from 1364 in 1980 to 
4297 in 1999 and in the West from 1364 to 4502. (Source: Comments of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture before the Surface Transportation Board, STB Docket No. 
34000, Canadian National Railway Co. et al—Control—Wisconsin Central Railway Co., 
June 25, 2001). 
Despite opposition from The Department of Justice to many of the major mergers, 
STB has approved them. We believe that the reason the STB was given merger authority 
rather than the Department of Justice is precisely because mergers were anticipated that 
would lead to increased rates from reduced competition, and this was perceived as a 
benefit by the proponents of deregulation (which included the railroads). “The railroad 
industry is perhaps the only U.S. industry that has been, or ever will be, deregulated be-
cause of its poor financial performance under regulation” (Grimm and Winston (2000), p. 
41). Indeed, although railroads rates in general have declined, captive shippers now have 
much less protection than before deregulation and pay substantial rate differentials com-
pared to non-captive shippers. 
In March 2000, the STB issued a moratorium on mergers. In June 2001, it issued new 
merger regulations in which merged carriers would have an increased burden to show 
that the proposed merger would not harm competition. There have been no mergers 
among Class I railroads since. Recently, there have been congressional attempts to re-
move the antitrust immunity of railroads regarding mergers and other pricing matters 
(Gallagher (2006)). 
D. Trucks 
As already discussed, trucking regulation emerged under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 
partly as an attempt to control competition with railroads. The trucking industry, espe-
cially its unions, was able to become a powerful interest group whom regulators pro-
tected from competition. (Estimates are that wages were 30 percent higher or more than 
otherwise, and that this premium accounted for the bulk of the regulatory rents to truck-
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ing. (See Rose (1987) and Moore (1978).)) Entry was controlled with carriers needing 
certificates to carry certain commodities on particular routes. Rates were regulated. 
The trucking industry is composed of two very different segments, truck load (TL) 
and less than truck load (LTL). The TL segment consists of firms that ship in truckloads 
from origin to destination. In contrast, the LTL segment consists of firms that will pick 
up several small shipments, and deliver them to their final destinations after making sev-
eral stops to either pick up or drop off other shipments. Therefore, the LTL segment is a 
network industry where scale (or geographic scope) matters, while the TL segment is not. 
Deregulation had very different effects on these two segments. 
Deregulation led to an increase in the total number of trucking firms. For example, 
the number of certified carriers rose from about 18,000 in 1980 to about 40,000 by the 
end of the 1980’s (Nebesky et al. (1995)). In sharp contrast, the number of LTL carriers 
fell from around 600 firms in the late 1970s to 237 firms in the late 1980s and to 135 
firms by the early 1990s (Feitler et al. (1997)). Moreover, there was evidence that pre-
deregulation, LTL carriers earned rents that were eliminated after deregulation. 
Although LTL carriers have increased in size, they did not rely on merger but rather 
on expansion of the territory of individual carriers. (Mergers were not used in order to 
avoid being struck with unfunded pension liabilities. Post deregulation, the value of an 
active firm was negative after the value of its operating certificate fell (Boyer (1993))). 
Although the evidence seems to confirm that regulation forced the LTL sector to have too 
many firms, evidence on scale in the LTL sector (Giordono (1997)) supports the view 
that there will remain a sufficient number of efficient LTL carriers to preserve competi-
tion. 
The deregulation of trucking applied to interstate but not intrastate shipments. States 
were able to, and some did, regulate rates and entry of intrastate trucking. Some states 
explicitly granted antitrust immunity, while others did not. (In the 38 states that regulated 
trucking under 500 pounds, 22 had granted antitrust immunity to truckers as of 1987.) 
Econometric analysis (Daniel and Kleit (1995)) of rates in the states that still regulated 
trucking showed that in the LTL segment entry regulation raised rates by over 20 percent, 
rate regulation by over 5 percent and antitrust immunity by about 12 percent. In the TL 
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segment, only rate regulation had a statistically significant effect on price -- more than 32 
percent. As of 1994, Congressional legislation forbids states from regulating trucking 
rates, except for moving companies. 
Although employment in trucking continued to grow after deregulation, one estimate 
finds that deregulation caused a reduction of 250,000 to 300,000 union jobs, or about 20 
percent of total workers in trucking (Hunter and Mangum (1995)). This is further evi-
dence that trucking regulation was heavily influenced by the powerful Teamsters Union. 
Moreover the wage effect in the LTL segment was small but wages declined significantly 
in the TL sector (Belzer (1995)). 
*** 
Although we have not examined all regulated industries, we have looked at several. 
Regulation created numerous inefficiencies and benefited special groups. In response to 
criticisms of regulation, antitrust either completely or partially replaced regulation and 
antitrust was used as a complement and sometimes as a constraint on regulators in many 
industries. The deregulated network industries that we examined all show a similar pat-
tern: after deregulation, there is massive consolidation, a lessening of the reliance on in-
terconnection from other firms, a decline in either wages or employment or both, and a 
fall in prices with a reduction or end to any cross subsidy. Consumers benefit, special in-
terests are harmed. 
Conclusion 
More than a century ago, the federal government started controlling competition, first 
railroads through the Interstate Commerce Act and then the general economy under the 
Sherman Act. The Commerce Act assigned primary responsibility to the first great fed-
eral agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, while the Sherman Act relied for its 
implementation on federal courts of general jurisdiction. Since that time, there has been 
an ongoing struggle to formulate the appropriate policy for controlling competition and to 
determine the right balance between antitrust and regulation for implementing that pol-
icy. 
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Regulation and antitrust are two competing mechanisms to control competition. The 
early history in which special courts were established and then abolished, and in which 
the FTC was created illustrate this point. The relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each mechanism became clearer over time. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and fa-
vors to special interests, but was able to specify prices and specific rules of how firms 
should deal with each other. Antitrust, especially when it became economically coherent 
within the past 30 years or so, showed itself to be reasonably good at promoting competi-
tion, avoiding the favoring of special interests, but not good at formulating specific rules 
for particular industries. The partial and full deregulation movement was a response to 
the recognition of the relative advantages of regulation and antitrust. This does not mean 
that no sector will be regulated, but rather that competition, constrained only by antitrust, 
will be used over more activities, even in regulated industries.  
Aside from being viewed as substitutes, antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as 
complements in which the activities of an industry can be subject to both regulatory and 
antitrust scrutiny. In this way, the complementary use of regulation and antitrust can as-
sign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative 
strengths, and in some settings, antitrust can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. 
The trends in network industries indicate that regulators, not antitrust courts, will bear the 
responsibility for formulating interconnection policies in partially deregulated industries, 
but antitrust will remain in the background as a club that firms can use if regulators allow 
incumbents to acquire market power either through merger or predatory acts.  
The history shows that at least for the United States, the increased use of the Sherman 
Act instead of regulation to control competition, and when necessary, the complementary 
use of the two, has brought benefits to consumers. 
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